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ABSTRACT 
The law of requisite variety is widely employed in management theorizing, 
and is linked with core strategy themes such as contingency and fit. We reflect 
upon requisite variety as an archetypal borrowed concept. We contrast its 
premises with insights from institutional and commitment literatures, draw 
propositions that set boundaries to its applicability, and review the 
ramifications of what we term “complexity misalignment.” In this way, we 
contradict foundational assumptions of the law, problematize adaptation- and 
survival-centric views of strategizing, and theorize the role of human agency 
in variously complex regimes. 
 
Keywords: requisite variety; complexity; institutional work; commitment; 
adaptation; fit; contingency; survival; choice; determinism; isomorphism; 
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Management theorists, following a systemic approach in exploring the social realm, often 
explain phenomena and their complexity through an analogical reasoning that builds on 
patterns observed in natural, mechanical, and, in general, non-socially constructed systems. A 
pertinent example is the “law of requisite variety” (LRV) (Ashby, 1956), which was 
constituted at the evolving crossroads of cybernetics and biology (reformulated as requisite 
complexity; Boisot & McKelvey, 2006). The law posits that a system’s viability is dependent 
on its capacity to confront an external variety (complexity) with an internal one. Specifically, 
for survival, an organization’s internal and external variety/complexity should (at least) 
match. Despite the intuitive appeal of the LRV, we argue that mimetic representations of laws 
originating in other fields may require alternative conceptualizations and a careful drawing of 
boundary conditions (Suddaby, Hardy, & Huy, 2011). However, two premises of the LRV are 
mirrored as major assumptions in much of management theorizing. First, “survival” appears 
as an intrinsic goal of any organization; second, an organization’s “adaptation/adaptability” 
(i.e., its configurative capacity for internal representations that match external 
variety/complexity) is seen as the exclusive means for that survival. We conceptualize the 
notion of “complexity misalignment” to contradict those foundational management premises. 
The LRV is portrayed as a doctrine and reflects core management discourses (e.g., fit and 
contingency). In this sense, the law is not an apparatus for peripheral theorizing, but, rather, a 
widely employed yet “transposed” generalization, the foundations of which are essentially 
associated with key themes that define the management research agenda. This centrality of 
the gist of the LRV for management is our source of problematization (Alvesson & Sandberg, 
2011) with our motivation being: (a) to critically engage with the LRV and its tenets, 
following our scholarly reflection upon its (mis)appropriation in management, and (b) to 
effect a dialogue about the role of human agency amid complexity. Accordingly, we follow a 
dialectical scrutiny of this cross-paradigmatic law and its borrowed premises, enabled and 
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guided by institutional and commitment discourses, and we contribute to the field in three 
ways. First, we enrich the scholarly vocabulary by introducing new complexity concepts, 
while fleshing out the theorizing value of conscious (non)dealings with perceived complexity. 
Second, we explicate how agency may be exercised amid opposing complexity regimes, a 
core management concern that is largely under-theorized. Third, by drawing boundary 
conditions, we challenge deterministic, isomorphic, and teleological assumptions that 
dominate discussions of adaptation and survival in the literature. 
We start with a review of “requisite variety” as an employed notion in management 
theorizing. The LRV—perhaps as a result of its verisimilitude and parsimony—has long been 
taken for granted by management scholars (see below). Empirical substantiation, though, is 
strikingly scarce. This disconnect between the premises of a widely employed law and actual 
experience is attributable to various reasons. It may, for example, be due to the excessive use 
of simulations in studying complexity; or the analytical convenience that the law’s succinct 
articulation offers to scholars who unquestioningly adopt it; or the as-yet-unresolved 
challenge of operationalizing and objectively measuring complexity (Cannon & John, 2007; 
Garud, Gehman, & Kumaraswamy, 2011). However, it is definitely not due to the law being 
universally confirmed. In fact, despite its wide appeal, studies that could (dis)confirm the 
LRV’s foundational assumptions are seriously absent from the management literature. 
Essentially, management studies that adopt the law articulate the validity of their 
arguments upon the premise of its a priori applicability. The LRV has thus become an 
analytic proposition; a canonical statement that is conceptually appealing yet not empirically 
validated. We argue that such cognitive closure perpetuates contestable assumptions. As 
Powell observes, “All analytic propositions are, by definition, true,” and, thus, they preclude 
shedding light on theoretically meaningful yet “unexplainable empirical anomalies” (2001: 
882, 885). This prompted us to ask: Could there be organizations that might be configured at 
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low (high) internal/high (low) external complexity and yet still survive contrary to the LRV? 
If “yes,” what are the enabling factors that explain such schemas, and why do scholars 
underestimate this possibility and promote the view of mortality for non-isomorphic gestalts? 
Next, we discuss the law and how management interpreters use its premises. We then 
develop the organizing concept that provides structure to our study—what we call 
“complexity misalignment.” We anchor agentic acts in and illustrate (non)dealings with 
perceived complexity, blend our own arguments with institutional and commitment insights, 
and draft propositions that delineate boundaries to the law’s applicability. We then explicate 
the contribution, limitations, and further research potential of our study and conclude with 
remarks on the nature of law-like generalizations in management theorizing. 
 
REQUISITE VARIETY AND ITS APPROPRIATION IN MANAGEMENT 
A main management premise is that external dynamism requires organizations to be 
adaptive. During this pursuit, the paradox of finding a balance between efficiency (which 
requires internal stability) and effectiveness (which requires external adaptability) emerges 
(Thompson, 1967). Therefore, the variety of a system must be able to regulate the variety 
with which it is confronted or more succinctly, “Only variety can destroy variety,” as Ashby 
famously noted (1956: 207). This is known as the “law of requisite variety.” What stands out 
as pertinent for our study is an organization’s ability to adapt to external variety through 
matching representations (Lord, Hannah, & Jennings, 2011; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011). 
The need to develop requisite levels of variety in order to survive raises an important 
question: “What if the organization’s variety (complexity [our input]) is either too much or 
too little?” (Lewis & Stewart, 2003: 32). If it is too much, the organization wastes resources; 
if it is too little, it is exposed to greater risk. Therefore, the goal is to match internal and 
external variety/complexity through adaptation (reflecting notions of fit, determinism, and 
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isomorphism; Tan, 2007; Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007; Peteraf & Reed, 2007). 
Organizations in the “fit” quadrants of a 2×2 landscape will survive; those in the “unfit” ones 
will not. Another thesis, widening the scope of applicability, posits that internal 
variety/complexity must be at least as great as the external one in order that organizations 
can cement their adaptability in the light of unexpected external variety/complexity 
(reflecting notions of dynamic capabilities, evolutionary fit and adaptive capacity; Barreto, 
2010; Kor & Mesko, 2013; Weigelt & Sarkar, 2012). 
For example, in leadership studies, the value of adaptability (Lord et al., 2011) and 
emergent self-organization (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001) is explained through matching 
internal/external complexity; In competitive strategy and corporate governance, studies 
caution that a narrow scope of actions in a complex setting renders simpler firms, since they 
violate the LRV in this way, unable to react to change (Kim, Burns, & Prescott, 2009; Ndofor 
et al., 2011); In management learning, effective outcomes are only possible if the amount of 
variation in inputs to a system is matched and met by equally diverse learning process options 
(Lengnick-Hall & Sanders, 1997); In family business theorizing, firms must increase internal 
variety in line with external one in order to avoid decline (Moores, 2009); In marketing, firms 
must be able to reconfigure internal diversity since the latter must reflect external uncertainty 
(Wollin & Perry, 2004); in operations management, requisite variety translates into slack 
resources that allow a firm to adapt to hypercompetitive environments (Kristal, Huang, & 
Roth, 2010). Indeed, requisite variety is utilized in many more management fields: in the role 
of intuition (Dane & Pratt, 2007) and dissent (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999) in managerial 
decision making; subgroups in work teams (Carton & Cummings, 2012); exploratory learning 
and innovative capacity (McGrath, 2001); top management teams’ (Boone, van Olffen, van 
Witteloostuijn, & de Brabander, 2004) and multifaceted aspects of organizational diversity 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007); the entrepreneurial orientation/performance link (Lumpkin & 
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Dess, 1996); organizational learning (Weigelt & Sarkar, 2009); human resources architecture 
(Lepak & Snell, 1999); total quality management (Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Schroeder, 1994); 
organizational identities (Pratt & Foreman, 2000); and business survival (Singh, 1997)—as 
well as in the theorizing process itself (Godfrey, 2005; Lado, Boyd, Wright, & Kroll, 2006; 
Lewis & Grimes, 1999; Weick, 2007). Overall, the nomenclature of management-cum-
complexity scholars implies how the LRV is used in management theorizing: 
The centrality of environmental determinism and isomorphism. Notions of 
survival/decline and “matching” are interwoven in a self-perpetuating vocabulary that 
promotes the centrality of environmental determinism. Non-isomorphic configurations that 
do not arrange internal representations in a way that matches external complexity will 
inevitably trigger suboptimal performance (Walters & Bhuian, 2004).  
The intrinsic teleology and exclusive efficacy of adaptation. Essentially subscribing to 
the teleology of survival, management authors portray “adaptation” as the inherent means 
toward that goal. This follows a logic that permeates much of the complexity phraseology 
(mirrored in concepts such as “adaptive tensions” (Boisot & McKelvey, 2010) or “complex 
adaptive systems” (Eisenhardt & Piezunka, 2011)): Organizations must or intrinsically tend 
to adapt to external pressures. An implied, unwarranted passivity accepts the complex 
external environment as it is, with organizations portrayed as effortless adaptive machines 
that seek to internally match it. Adaptation, thus, appears as a sine qua non of proper 
strategizing, with internal variety serving the purpose of attaining survival (Ashmos, Duchon, 
& McDaniel, 2000). In this sense, requisite variety becomes the cornerstone that conceptually 
legitimizes the act of adaptation to a given or dynamic external environment (Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001). Otherwise, reducing internal variety diminishes the ability of organizations to 
adapt to change (Barge & Oliver, 2003)—an option that is seen as inherently detrimental. 
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Analytical assumptions on measurability. Employment of the law implies that there is a 
perceptible external complexity that can be matched through adapted representations. 
Accordingly, the relevant literature reifies complexity and portrays it as a countable entity 
whose given state can be calculated through cognitive means. Despite insightful advances in 
measuring complexity (see Lloyd, 2001), we do not subscribe to this view. Complexity may 
be understood as an empirical tendency (e.g. as high or low) but it has neither a fixed state to 
measure and match (given its inherent perturbations and hence, its ephemeral state) nor is 
there room for exclusively rational, effortful measurement. The latter assumption ignores the 
routine infusion of strategizing with emotions and visceral feelings, too (Hodgkinson and 
Healey, 2011). Thus, the efficacy of accurately measuring and, moreover, resiliently 
responding to complexity is not only debatable but is also paradoxically proliferated within a 
field (complexity) in which consensus on issues of measurement is still unattained. 
An undue outside-in perspective. The resource-based view and capability literatures 
notwithstanding, management-cum-complexity studies are largely marked by an “outside–in” 
perspective. The reference point in determining configurations of internal and external 
complexity is, predominantly, the latter. Organizations are portrayed as having to respond to 
external complexity by subsequently setting up matching internal configurations or higher 
ones for adaptability purposes. Voluntary choice is discredited as a source of managerial 
(in)action in dealing with complexity. Such a stance, though, contrasts with the enduring 
“choice vs. determinism” debate (Bedeian, 1990; de Rond & Thietart, 2007; Hrebiniak & 
Joyce, 1985) as well as the sensemaking processes that enable organizations to become 
shapers or reproducers of their surroundings (Boisot & Child, 1999; Weick, 1979). 
The neglected role of human agency. Several complexity realms (chaos theory or 
dissipative structures) and concepts (self-organizing systems or naturally emergent order) 
privilege system-level explanations at the expense of shedding light on micro underpinnings. 
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Thus, who initiates and organizes the emergence of those aggregate outcomes (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2011)? Here, the interplay between actors and structures as well as actors’ traits 
(e.g., their reflexive capacity) are neglected (Archer, 1995; Giddens, 1984). This lack of 
understanding about actors called to configure matching representations has sidelined the role 
of agency in coping with complex regimes. However, without an understanding of human 
intervention, how can we subscribe to the etiology for and assess the causal efficacy of 
adaptation (actors’ conscious choice) as the normative implication of the LRV? 
The uniformly dark side of complexity. Reifying complexity as an ontologically 
distinct and measurable entity entails an unwarranted meaning: the collective scholarly voice 
skews toward a uniformly “dark” side of complexity. External complexity is inherently 
detrimental, and, thus, organizations internally need to consciously do something against it 
(“defeat it,” Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; “destroy it,” Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; “regulate it,” 
Surie & Hazy, 2006). Otherwise, they are subject to decline and, ultimately, mortality. 
A superficial embrace of the law. Most studies merely use the law as a rule of thumb 
that justifies analytical results and supports methodological choices, or as a passing reference 
that solidifies conceptual justifications and hypotheses building related to matching and 
survival. However, they hardly challenge the axiomatic properties of the law. 
Theory-building architecture. We contend that this superficial way of employing the 
law has led to a significant absence of boundary conditions and scope of applicability. These 
are integral elements of proper theorizing (Corley & Gioia, 2011), which brings us to a 
theory-building oxymoron: studies base their plausibility on a law of requisite sufficiency that 
itself lacks the requisite characteristics necessary to being sufficiently qualified as a law. 
Certainly, complexity is a field with fine contributions. It helped us to comprehend co-
evolution, emergence and non-linearity (Ceja & Navarro, 2011); to reflect upon how order 
emerges out of chaos (Stacey, 1992); and to shed light on the exponential consequences that 
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initial conditions have on embodied meta-structures (Baum & Silverman, 2001). Thus, it 
constitutes a field with a heritage as well as a contemporary and future value. In this sense, 
the LRV, as a foundational cornerstone of the complexity discourse, is one of the inspiring 
theories that management has borrowed. Yet, we remain skeptical about its appropriation. 
Table 1 reflects this skepticism as well as echoing the law’s contribution. It illustrates how 
the LRV—as a transposed theory—has impeded as well as advanced management theory. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Table 1 is not an attempt to capture the pros or cons of complexity theories. It 
summarizes our thoughts on how the LRV is appropriated in management and on the 
subsequent theorizing implications for our field. It reminds us that the LRV—despite 
complexity’s privileged position to stress the limitations of prescriptive organizational 
configurations (given its focus on unpredictability; Dougherty & Dunne, 2011)—has been 
used to unduly legitimate an inordinate emphasis on organizational change and adaptation to 
match some type of measurable, perceptible complexity. Not only is the implementation of 
such a recommendation arguably undoable, but there seems little theoretical justification for 
this emphasis on matching contingency. This ignores much of the strategy’s legacy, too, 
which recognizes the role of equifinality in supporting multiple strategies for reaching the 
same, desired end (e.g. survival). While, below, we use the institutional and commitment 
literatures as a segue into why non-isomorphic strategies would be pursued volitionally, 
clearly, the LRV perspective neglects studies that conceptualize purposefully misaligned 
strategies. For example, an organization that commits to the current institutional bulwark in 
the face of added complexity is indicative of the Miles and Snow (1978) defender strategy; 
the high internal complexity firm seeking to overturn its more placid environment echoes the 
features described in the prospector; and, perhaps arguably, the analyzer is the LRV 
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candidate. In this sense, the LRV perspective views organizations as either analyzers or 
reactors, and truly makes little accommodation for the enactment of different positions. Thus, 
we point out that strategy’s own heritage is not consistent with the one right contingency 
perspective that the LRV promotes (cf. Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993)1. 
Certainly, adopting axiomatic principles that contradict the legacy of strategy does not 
imply that the LRV is universally non-applicable. As implied in Table 1, several contexts 
lend themselves to matching complexity as a priority. For example, organizations seeking to 
safeguard their historically gained legitimacy (e.g., dominant political parties), ones with 
central positions in a stratified field (e.g., market leaders), or ones with privileged access to 
institutional gatekeepers (e.g., MNEs and governments in developing countries) may 
reasonably align themselves with structural properties, thus affirming the LRV. Therefore, we 
do not render the law as universally non-applicable, promoting one more, yet reverse, 
canonical judgment. Rather, we seek to expand its explanatory scope by conceptualizing non-
applicability zones, in the belief that setting boundaries makes theories “more powerful and 
more precise” (Adner & Levinthal, 2004: 83). We thus question the unconditional adoption 
of the LRV. Perhaps, this has taken place because of the indifference of non-social sciences 
authors and Ashby “in dealing with social systems. It is only their later interpreters who made 
the arching leaps which the founders never cared to make” (Zeleny, 1986: 270). 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING COMPLEXITY MISALIGNMENT 
Our epistemological stance toward a law of limited empirical scrutiny does not allow us 
to claim knowledge (i.e., is it the case?) or understanding (i.e., why is it the case?) of its 
applicability (Lipton, 2001). We sought an alternative explanation that could be conceptually 
contrasted against it, drawing upon dissimilar literature fields. The desideratum was to 
identify a meaningful vocabulary that could help us frame arguments, articulate their 
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explanatory power, and identify potential zones of imperfection for the law (Morton, 1990; 
Tsang & Ellsaesser, 2011). Specifically, we sought to identify potential causes for its non-
applicability, since these differentiate “between the occurrence and non-occurrence of what 
they explain” (Lipton, 2001: 43). We theorize upon non-isomorphic configurations—high 
(low) internal/low (high) external complexity—and conceive factors that enable their 
emergence. We conceptualize these configurations as representing “complexity 
misalignment,” which we define as “disproportionate degrees of complexity found within and 
outside a focal organization.” “Complexity misalignment” is our mode of revisiting the LRV 
drawing upon the “institutional work” and “commitment to the status quo (CSQ)” literatures. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
We argue that complexity misalignment may be a necessary condition for transformation 
or reproduction, notwithstanding an end goal of survival. Notably, diverse contingencies 
evoke complexity misalignment. The latter reflects complex/less complex organizational 
schemata in relation to external complexity, which challenges the monosemantic and 
unambiguous nature of the LRV’s interpretations and much of management scholarship. 
Specifically, we conceptualize two misaligned modes of how organizations may engage with 
complexity. “Complexity amplification” refers to internally configuring an organization’s 
processes in more complex ways than would be implied by an ordered regime. This would be 
necessary for environmental enactment. “Complexity disregard” refers to internally 
configuring an organization’s processes in less complex ways than would be suggested by a 
chaotic regime. A focus on effective complexity can be consciously chosen as a result of 
managerial discretion. Thus, our propositions below show that complexity can be embraced 
or disregarded, too, depending on institutional stimuli or individual characteristics. On the 
one hand, complexity amplification is desirable, as this can pave the way for institutional 
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shift. On the other hand, complexity can be disregarded, as it may be too crude and it 
becomes unwieldy for an organization to even pretend to be efficiently dealing with its 
“messiness.” The latter may apply to all organizations, and, thus, other factors will determine 
survival—not the ability of any given organization in a sector to cope with crude complexity.  
For example, who can argue that SMEs, family firms, or MNEs that survive for 
generations are or consciously become isomorphic/adapt to their complex environments? 
Can’t their sustainability be attributed to reasons such as chance (de Rond & Thietart, 2007), 
luck (Parnell, Dent, O’Regan, & Hughes, 2012), or phronesis (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997)? 
Management interpretations of the LRV are thus based on assumptions of calculative 
rationality and isomorphic intentionality such that “high performance emanates from 
effective strategizing, strategy execution and managerial excellence” (Parnell et al., 2012: 
S104). However, studies (e.g., Denrell, 2005; Parnell & Dent, 2009; Parnell et al., 2012) 
concretely challenge this view, which stems from unwarranted expectations for observed 
causality in “proper” business theorizing. Luck, chance, prudence, and such media toward a 
goal are seen as elusive, resulting in a modernist’s quagmire. The latter’s instruments do not 
normally care to capture the nature, strength, and directionality of these elusive terms since 
they are unobserved causes of an unknown effect. As a result, complexity misalignment is a 
priori, widely yet unjustifiably regarded as fatal for an organization by the LRV interpreters.  
Adaptation/Adaptability. We challenge the mono-dimensional view of aligning 
organizations’ policies with external pressures through market-driven practices, 
environmental scanning, conformity, legitimacy, or an overly “adaptationist” view of 
strategizing. The latter view dominates management and complexity discourses (Cannon & 
John, 2007; Child & Rodrigues, 2011). We do not deny the value of environmental 
determinism or isomorphism. Yet, we remain skeptical about their labeling as an inevitable 
pursuit while portraying organizations as aspirational enactors or committed reproducers of 
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non-isomorphic routines. Moreover, we remain incredulous regarding the notion of 
“adaptability,” or the extensive repertoires of an organization (i.e., its higher internal 
variety/complexity) that allow it to deploy adaptive responses to unexpected external 
complexity. While the concept may be useful in many respects, it still underplays the goal 
and possibility of enforcing change or doing nothing against perceived complexity 
(irrespective of any capacity or not to adapt). Organizations are still seen as oriented toward 
better ways of coping with high external complexity (e.g., through internal slack), but not as 
agents of change or as agents committed to a familiar status—just as better adaptors.  
Overall, we demonstrate that seeing adaptability as the sole roadmap toward survival 
ignores equifinality as well as strategy’s own heritage. Contrary to core management and 
complexity conventions, we do not portray organizations as determined to mechanistically 
adapt to a structural legality, nor cognitive agents (managers) as inherently seeking to arrange 
internal representations of an external reality for purposes of survival. Rather, we articulate a 
constant interplay of creative predispositions and purposive action in a context of prevailing 
logics (e.g., institutional or moral); an interplay of cognition and feelings that challenges a 
representational view of organizing and shows that organizations may incessantly strive for 
transformation or reproduction, not adaptation, as the means for survival. 
Organizational Survival. We focus on survival as the perceived upshot in the LRV, and 
we extend arguments in order to discuss an underresearched observation: organizational 
survival, decline, deliverance, or death are contingently perceived and attempted, and are 
ultimately linked to human cognition and agency (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006b). They can 
all be gestalts of organizational (not)being in an existential space. The voluntary choice of 
what organizations want to become in this space implies that survival does not constitute an 
inherent pursuit, nor disappearance an inherent goal to avoid. For example, disappearance 
may reflect prescience and intention leading to organizational deliverance, and not a passive 
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death as a result of managerial inefficiency (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006b). Non-survival 
may be consciously chosen since it serves a wider strategic goal or idiosyncratic pursuits of a 
socially constructed system—a fine point that the LRV and most management scholars do not 
capture. Instead, their foundational assumptions are firmly embedded within natural systems, 
and, correspondingly, the intrinsic goal of survival. As a result, the mechanistic nomenclature 
of Ashby’s interpreters (partly derived from Ashby’s mathematical formalism) engenders an 
intrinsic teleology: it promotes adaptation or adaptability (the means) as necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the supposedly inherent purpose of survival (the telos).  
We do not feel comfortable with the unidirectionality of teleology towards survival for 
organizations. Instead, we argue for a situated teleology that acknowledges the multiple states 
of (not)being that can be intentionally pursued. Teleological orientations may include 
deliverance, prosperity, virtue, meaningfulness, legitimacy or social change, and may be 
achieved through morphing, phronesis, restructuring, conformity, or foresight (Crockett, 
2005; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006b; Solomon, 1992). Therefore, multiple antecedents, such 
as individuals’ egocentric or ethical predispositions, collective deontological orientations, 
professional standards, market pressures, or economic concerns (Bowie, 2000; Etzioni, 2003) 
challenge survival-centric organizational purposes. Contrary to the teleological determinism 
implied by an exclusive focus on survival, we urge for a multiparadigmatic understanding of 
organizational teleology and the strategies that best serve any given purpose (if any). 
An Ashbyan View of Organizing. Certainly, survival may be a desirable end state. Thus, 
Ashby was legitimately concerned with survival and adaptation (and not with other 
teleological alternatives and means) simply because this is a fair focus. Under such a light, 
the previous paragraphs may appear to be unfair to Ashby. Accordingly, we elucidate that we 
challenge an “Ashbyan” view on organizing and not Ashby himself. Ashby’s oeuvre may 
promote survival as an intrinsic goal, but, given his indifference in socially constructed 
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organizations, his arguments cannot be scrutinized through a management lens such as ours. 
Even if we problematize the insistence on adaptive behavior as a prerequisite for survival, we 
distance ourselves from challenging Ashby’s view, since we do not examine if this applies to 
other, non-socially constructed (e.g., biological or mechanical) systems. This concern was 
Ashby’s, but is not ours. Here, we are only interested in Ashby’s interpretations that relate to 
management theorizing, and we argue that an “Ashbyan” view of organizing is paramount. 
 
Human Agency and the Complexity Discourse 
A common thread permeates our discussion of the LRV against the institutional and 
commitment literatures below: the role of human agency amid distinct complexity regimes. 
Agency—as a process conditioned by the past, oriented toward the future, and informed by 
the present (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998)—can yield multiple arrangements. An iterative view 
may translate into mimicry and repetition of routines. However, the schematization of 
experiences may also inflict critical deliberation and perceived need for change inspired by 
past misfortunes and propelled by a situated opportunity. Similarly, a projective view may 
translate into disruptive and imaginative transformation. However, it may also consolidate 
conservative action in light of unpredicted consequences. A practical-evaluative, present-
oriented view (which contextualizes the prior two) can, thus, yield any aligned or misaligned 
configuration, depending on how imaginative, capable, and bold the actors are.  
We understand agency as neither the result of habitual judgment nor of rational 
purposivity and calculative action toward future optimization. We understand it as the 
cognitive and emotional interplay between past, present, and future orientations situated 
within varying structural complexities. Importantly, we note that agentic choices are 
exercised in bounded ways. We may generally perceive agency as an ability and will to act, 
but we make sense of agency also in terms of agentic inability: agents may be reflexive actors 
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yet they do not posses any predictive ability, nor can they fully access and reliably process 
accurate information. They may project themselves into “possibilities of being” (Emirbayer 
& Mische, 1998: 986), but they do so in a social context of ambiguity that is inherently 
associated with an uncertain process of “becoming” or “maintaining.” What cements this 
uncertainty is the complexity of the socio-historical structures that condition agentic action 
(Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Mutch, 2007; Mutch, Delbridge, & Ventresca, 2006). 
This observation, which stresses the limitations of agency, is important for a discussion of 
agency in the context of complexity (cf., limitations in managing variety (complexity) were 
also a theme of Ashby’s work). A main assumption is that, out there, there is a sort of 
perceptible complexity that, as soon as it is measured, lends itself to rational responses. If that 
were the case, then, the practical-evaluative element of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) 
would be relatively straightforward. Agents would make normative judgments among known 
alternatives rationally responding to the calculated complexities of their inhabited structures. 
We contend that this is unmanageable. Choices may be based on a capacity and will to act, 
but such agentic characteristics never manifest themselves optimally, due to structural 
constraints and actors’ limitations. Agency is conditioned by chance, inaccurate access to 
information, emotional commitments, powerful others, and so on. For example, chaotic 
regimes aggravate cognitive constraints because of unpredictability (Mitchell, Shepherd, & 
Sharfman, 2011). Similarly, ordered regimes may reduce motivation to act due to the 
stagnation associated with rigid norms (Mainemelis, 2010). We argue, though, that such 
constraints do not inherently weaken the role of agency; they just diminish the likelihood of 
its optimal or desirable manifestation (which is, in any case, a utopian pursuit). On the 
contrary, we contend that, exactly because of these constraints, agency is ubiquitous and 
results from a critical deliberation upon the inevitable constraints of order and chaos.  
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Agency and complexity amplification. We highlight the role of agency in disrupting 
institutionalized practices in an ordered regime. Organizational agents initiate and actively 
participate in the implementation of non-isomorphic change, thus challenging deterministic 
views that promote the matching contingency as the exclusive strategizing perspective. Our 
conceptualization of complexity amplification is a demonstration of how actors may shift 
their agentic logic and exercise mediating influence upon their “problematic” settings. 
We claim that the contexts that actors inhabit—no matter how compelling they may seem 
to be—have been relationally produced by humans, and can again change by them (Battilana, 
Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Delbridge & Edwards, 2008). We do not limit our understanding 
of agency in terms of upward conflation, though (i.e., that people are powerful enough to 
orchestrate structural parts; Archer, 2000; Mutch, Delbridge, & Ventresca, 2006). We draw 
parallelisms with Archer’s (1995) morphogenesis, accepting its analytical logic and 
ontological caveats. According to this perspective, the past has endowed us with structured, 
emergent properties with which actors interact in enabling and constraining terms (Mutch, 
2007). We do not see emergent structures as historically separate and intrinsically given. 
Certainly, they have been shaped through a trajectory of relations between structure and 
actors. Archer’s (2003) stratified ontology, though, which analytically separates actors and 
structures, helps us to “frame the historical conditioning of logics without disembedding 
actors from the social world” (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013: 928–929). In this interplay 
between subjective personal properties and objective structures, actors are seen as reflexive 
participants who can change established orders. Structural conditioning and agentic interests, 
collaborative schemes, moral orientations, personal histories, cognition, and visceral jolts 
ignite “internal conversations”—inner dialogues related to who we want to become, what are 
our ultimate concerns, and which is (or should be) our modus vivendi (Archer, 2003). In turn, 
such conversations enable action toward structural elaboration (Mutch, 2007). 
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Viewing our “complexity amplification” thesis through a morphogenetic lens translates as 
follows: internal conversations deliberately lead to intraorganizational complexification, the 
latter being the reflexively chosen leverage to overcome structural constraints and pursue 
change. Complicating oneself is a promising agentic means to circumvent institutional 
arrangements that would otherwise call for an unwelcomed compromise. Our discussion 
around institutional work below shows that the latitude of employed agency does not 
inherently justify isomorphic pursuits. Especially when the goal is as broad as survival, 
enactive agency sprung from reflexive deliberation can help us achieve goals in multiple, 
equifinal ways, which undermine the predictive validity of the matching contingency 
approach (cf. Gresov & Drazin, 1997) by being reasonably misaligned. 
Agency and complexity disregard. We show the role of agency in sustaining 
organizational logics in a chaotic regime. Organizational agents become the enablers of 
reproduction by consciously disregarding the pressures to actively navigate a complex 
structure. While, often, such complexities are portrayed as unavoidable pressures toward 
adaptation, we identify conditions that render such assertions moot. Actors, following 
Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) practical-evaluative dimension of agency, must possess the 
capacity to make a judgment among alternative trajectories of action and as a response to 
emergencies, dilemmas, and ambiguity. In the context of external complexity, this capacity 
arguably becomes bounded. The need for ontological security urges individuals to reproduce 
internal structures and commit to “the known and the given” (Mutch, 2007: 1130).  
This quest for order and continuity does not merely act as an emotional gatekeeper. It has 
cognitive and existential implications, which translate into confidence that one is doing the 
right thing and allow a sense of consistent identity amid change (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). 
This is a typical agentic act of intentionality simply because the actor might do otherwise but 
not chooses to do so (Giddens, 1984). The more complex the regime, the more mutable the 
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situation, the more indeterminate and more likely the nonrepeatability of its manifestations 
(Nussbaum, 1986). Such a complexity does not lend itself to universal prescriptions and 
unambiguous modes of acting; only room for situated judgment manifested, in our case, in 
disregarding complexity as a result of self-efficacy—the ignition of human agency—and the 
understanding that agency is not deployed in a “blank slate” format but in a context where 
people have commitments that reproduce structures (Hitlin & Elder, 2007). Such 
commitments may stem from pre-determined lines of activity or personal biographies, and 
imply that agency does not come to the surface only when actors encounter, for example, an 
economic challenge or projected change that requires action contrary to social expectations 
(Suddaby & Viale, 2011). It also appears following a motivation to secure our ontological 
position, to project the authenticity of our actions, and to legitimize our identity and status. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL WORK AND COMMITMENT TO THE STATUS QUO: 
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND PROPOSITIONS 
A holistic review of complexity theories is not within the remit of this paper. We focus on 
LRV as a pivotal law within the complexity discourse, and construe propositions that act as 
boundary conditions by integrating insights from institutional and commitment theories with 
Boisot and McKelvey’s (2010) regimes of external complexity (from chaotic (high) to 
ordered (low)). Our propositions do not treat these conditions as an idiosyncratic “noise” that 
must be controlled. Rather, they are the platforms upon which the scope of the applicability 
of the law can be re-set and a wider dialogue can commence. This logic is in line with Boisot 
and McKelvey’s (2010) attempt to reconcile diverse perspectives in complexity science by 
suggesting zones of organizational responses on a landscape of varying regimes of 
complexity (from low to high). This “spatial” approach is engendered in our propositions. 
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Institutional Work As a Boundary Condition: Complexity Amplification in an Ordered 
Regime 
Institutional theory portrays actors as agents. While institutional theory emphasized stasis 
and continuity, change-oriented behaviors are also cemented as a desirable outcome behind 
agency practices (Suddaby, 2010a). Entrepreneurship research, too, associates itself with 
change. The evolution of these two previously disparate yet currently converging fields raised 
the “paradox of embedded agency” (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002): How can embedded 
actors circumvent or ignore normative schemas of their institutional environment and engage 
themselves in actions that defy or challenge learned and shared standards? In this study, the 
answer is relatively straightforward: if an external environment of low complexity does not 
fit with an organization’s aspirations or performance potential, then creating an internally 
complex organization is a prerequisite for a desired disruption. Enactive agency will unfold 
since institutions are subject to change and not just constraints to organizational pursuits. 
Collectively, institutional theory suggests that organizations systematically and 
consciously aim to preserve or re-shape their contexts (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006). This 
is attempted (and, perhaps, achieved) through the process of institutional work; that is, the 
intentional effort towards maintenance, disruption, or creation of new institutions (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011). While organizations may choose to 
emulate institutional arrangements, conformity may prove to be an unwelcome compromise 
when juxtaposed with organizational aspirations (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). Conformity in 
an institutionalized setting may serve the purpose of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013), but any chronic deficiencies of such a setting may also 
impede the operational efficiency of an aspiring organization. Thus, such an organization 
may intentionally depart from (or not participate in) institutional embeddedness, and 
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decouple itself from institutional arrangements while pursuing alternative praxis (Lawrence, 
Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002; Suddaby, Seidl, & Lê, 2013).  
Consequently, an organization proceeds to institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 
1988), actions that represent an interest in altering the established norms through mobilizing 
and leveraging resources (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 
2004). This attempt for change is based upon a belief: own capacity and organizational 
interests can yield superior rewards in a transformed context. The new landscape can 
facilitate organizational aspirations while the “constrained” one yields suboptimal returns. 
This deviance breaks away from the view of institutions as stable patterns of repeated events 
(Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006a; Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006). A non-isomorphic view explores conditions that facilitate disruption and 
transformation through power relations, political activism, network struggles, and ideological 
contradictions (Batjargal, Hitt, Tsui, Arregle, Webb, & Miller, 2013; Hargrave & Van de 
Ven, 2006; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008; Maguire & Hardy, 2006; Rojas, 2010). An 
important point to note is that such an attempt is likely to take place in an unfavorable setting: 
institutions tend to reward conformity, to reinforce continuity, and to maintain the status quo 
through, rituals, routines, or punitive action (Dacin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010; Garud, Hardy, & 
Maguire, 2007). Thus, arguably, many such settings—replete with coercive and normative 
pressures—may present low complexity. For an aspiring organization, this means that the 
pursuit of change may unfold in a hostile environment, given this contrived complacency.  
Research on institutional work, though, shows that internal processes not only circumvent 
conventional norms, but also reconfigure the external environment. Certainly, challenging 
conventional institutional wisdom requires reflection and bold decisions that are risky, costly, 
and utterly uncertain (Lawrence et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). The latter is inevitable, 
though, for an actor who does not seek support and legitimacy, but, rather, seeks to disrupt 
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the status quo (George et al., 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009). This is based on a hope for 
returns, which are in line with an underutilized resource capacity. In other words, the 
cognitive structures of an organization may not translate into conforming attitudinal stances 
and behaviors that are aligned with a placid institutional context. Rather, decision makers 
may morph their actions hoping for an ideally “other” institutional framework, irrespective of 
socially constructed norms. Therefore, agency, as a contingently constructed intervention, 
may be led by habit or critical judgment; commitment or aspirations; familiarity or novelty-
seeking predispositions. It creates landscapes of multiple shapes that are dictated by actors’ 
capacity (power) and willingness (interest) to transform or maintain the context in which they 
are embedded (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Townley, 2002; Zilber, 2007).  
In this section, our focus is on organizations that deploy institutional work for a desired 
change. This creates the need to configure internal processes and intraorganizational linkages 
in more complex ways that appear antithetical to the stability and complacency of an external 
environment of low complexity. Making sense of these rigid externalities through the same 
conforming lenses would not allow a sought-after institutional change. One can reasonably 
argue, therefore, that organizations operating in unfavorable environments of low external 
complexity are not likely to match this complexity with their internal one. Instead, such 
organizations will seek to challenge the dominant logic (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Thus: 
Proposition 1: The more contradictory the institutional arrangements with an 
organization’s interests and needs in an external environment that leans toward an 
ordered regime (low external complexity), the more complex the institutional work 
that needs to be intraorganizationally deployed (high internal complexity) in order to 
initiate and enable institutional disruption and/or creation. Hence, the lower the 
likelihood that the LRV (complexity) is confirmed in such conditions of complexity 
misalignment. 
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Organizations may lack legitimacy, too. This lack is a boundary condition that we expect 
to be part of amplifying complexity i.e., the higher such an organization’s inclination to 
mobilize resources toward change or disruption. Certainly, this mobilization is not 
automatically generated but constructed through complex organizational efforts (Suddaby, 
2010a). Moreover, no matter how it is internally constructed, its gist needs to be externally 
communicated so as to be translated into something useful (Lok, 2010; Smets et al., 2012). 
This is achieved through tactics such as e.g. discursive strategies, which stand out as pertinent 
in the institutional literature (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Hardy & Maguire, 2010; 
Maguire et al., 2004). The term “discursive strategies” refers to a systematic narrative that 
favorably interferes with the social constructions that shape institutions (Munir & Phillips, 
2005; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). These strategies 
are manifested through, for example, building and narrating conceptual arguments that are 
pro-institutional change. This is necessary, since institutional work is a relational pursuit 
(Delbridge & Edwards, 2008). An interaction with influential “others” requires a framing of 
arguments that can gain a wider consensus (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Khan, 
Munir, & Willmott, 2007; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Mobilizing resources (e.g., regular 
articles in the press) aims to “define the grievances and interests of aggrieved constituencies, 
diagnose causes, assign blame, provide solutions, and enable collective attribution processes 
to operate” (Snow & Benford, 1992: 150). A Systematic building of an argumentation that 
“fits” with the values, expectations, or aspirations of “others” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) 
builds the legitimacy required to gain acceptance. This is more likely to inflict collective 
actions that can enact deviation and change (Wijen & Ansari, 2007).  
Broadly speaking, this can be inculcated in two ways (see Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006): 
First, by specifying the “how” and “why” behind the fallacies of current arrangements (e.g., 
disassociating established practices from their moral foundations); second, by using a 
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constructive vocabulary that promotes the variegated benefits of an alternative institutional 
logic. This allows powerful stakeholders to perceive the attempt for change as meaningful 
and worthwhile. The interplay between societal, industrial, and organizational actors’ 
activities can inspire new institutional constellations, which enjoy wider acceptance (Wright 
& Zammuto, 2013). In turn, a cohort of “convinced” stakeholders can orchestrate actions and 
configure networking schemes that can enact desired change (Battilana et al., 2009). Further, 
achieving this status (that induces internal complexity) may be attempted in a low-
complexity, rigid environment that is more likely to enable an aspirational actor to proceed to 
action and pursue valued interests (Oliver, 1992; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012). Thus: 
Proposition 2: The lower the organizational legitimacy compared to established 
institutional logics in a field that leans toward the ordered regime (low external 
complexity), the more complex the institutional work that needs to be 
intraorganizationally deployed (high internal complexity) in order to initiate and 
enable institutional disruption and/or creation. Hence, the lower the likelihood that 
the LRV (complexity) is confirmed in such conditions of complexity misalignment. 
Institutionally embedded actors are neither motivated to change nor open to alternative 
arrangements (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006a). Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a) frame less 
embedded actors as peripheral players who are eager to dislocate themselves from established 
arrangements. This tendency to strive for change stems from their weak connection with 
more central organizations, their weak resource endowment, their disadvantageous position 
and the misaligned interests with central actors who have legitimate power to enact change 
but do not choose to do so (Sherer & Lee, 2002; Seo & Creed, 2002). Therefore, “low 
embeddedness combined with high interest dissatisfaction explains why actors might be 
motivated to consider change” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006a: 29). Such loosely embedded 
actors seek to disrupt stasis and continuity making a match between internal and external 
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complexity unlikely. Complex efforts of multiple, interacting individuals within such 
organizations seek to articulate multiple arguments, coordinate thinking, orchestrate actions, 
communicate institutional work, and monitor its effects (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Smets et al., 2012; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). A relevant 
rhetoric is employed to achieve change outcomes navigating through existing and new, 
related and unrelated frames, which may simultaneously impede and facilitate a focal actor’s 
institutional work (Creed et al., 2002; George et al., 2006; King & Soule, 2007). The need for 
such complex internal processes is aggravated because the goal of “frame breaking” while 
convincing about the value of something novel is utterly demanding (Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005): it requires altering established mindsets and challenging the conventional wisdom of 
an institutionally embedded audience in a context of low external complexity. Thus: 
Proposition 3: The more loosely embedded an organization in an external 
environment that is punctuated with a few dominant organizations and leans toward 
an ordered regime (low external complexity), the more likely the organization will 
pursue or experience complexity misalignment due to the complex institutional work 
that needs to be intraorganizationally deployed (high internal complexity) in an 
attempt to disrupt those established institutional arrangements or create new ones. 
Hence, the lower the likelihood that the LRV (complexity) is confirmed. 
 
Commitment to the Status Quo As a Boundary Condition: Complexity Disregard in a 
Chaotic Regime 
Literature insights demonstrate that stable environments habitually privilege dominant 
organizations. In turn, the latter are in favor of maintaining existing arrangements (DiMaggio, 
1988; Levy & Scully, 2007). This is partly due to the fact that, despite any external condition, 
there is no perceived need for a powerful actor who enjoys benefits to internally reconfigure 
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processes and activities; rather, they are keen to maintain conditions as they currently stand 
(Geletkanycz & Black, 2001; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993), indicating a 
certain “counter-entrepreneurship.” This conservative mindset is not only adopted in relation 
to institutional arrangements, but also in relation to intraorganizational configurations. 
Building on this core logic of conservation, Hambrick et al. (1993) conceptualized a top 
management team’s “commitment to the status quo” as a key concept that explains the 
tendency of, for example, the CEO toward no novel praxis, and is defined as the “belief in the 
enduring correctness of current organizational strategies and profiles” (Hambrick et al., 1993: 
402), even in conditions of significant turbulence. Given the centrality of the management 
team in an organization’s strategic decisions, such a stance is highly influential for its self-
positioning in relation to its environment (Geletkanycz, 1997; Kor & Mesko, 2013). Thus: 
Proposition 4: The higher a CEO’s or top management team’s CSQ (low internal 
complexity) in an external environment that leans toward a chaotic regime (high 
external complexity), the more likely the organization will not configure their internal 
processes or actions in complex ways, i.e., the more likely the organization will 
pursue or experience complexity misalignment. Hence, the lower the likelihood that 
the LRV (complexity) is confirmed. 
Building upon Proposition 4, we promote four “sub-conditions” aggravating high CSQ in 
chaotic regimes and consequently, the likelihood for complexity misalignment. Specifically, 
while CSQ may be seen as a rigidity that negatively influences performance (McClelland, 
Liang, & Barker, 2010), there is empirical evidence demonstrating that firms with high CSQ 
may be superior performers (Geletkanycz, 1997; Hambrick et al., 1993). In the midst of 
decidedly mixed findings, researchers have explored conditions that act as antecedents to 
CSQ or moderate its effect on performance. For example, several authors (Geletkanycz & 
Black, 2001; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Musteen, Barker, & Baeten, 2006) have studied a 
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CEO’s organizational and industry tenure, or enduring success and past performance, as 
sources of overconfidence and legitimate power that render strategic change, pursuit for 
innovation, and intraorganizational novelty (i.e., sources of internal complexity) less 
necessary (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006; Simsek, 2007). As Geletkanycz (1997) 
notes, the longer the tenure, the higher the possibility that CEOs accumulate a certain 
“industry wisdom,” which reduces openness to change and consolidates the belief about the 
validity of established routines and strategies. Thus: 
Proposition 4a: The longer a CEO’s or top management team’s organizational 
and/or industry tenure, the more likely there will be high CSQ, which will promote 
misalignment in high complexity environments.  
This belief is further reinforced as long as executives perceive the firm’s competitive 
position as satisfactory and the company experiences sustainable levels of desired 
performance (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001). Thus: 
Proposition 4b: The more enduring a focal organization’s performance, the more 
likely there will be high CSQ, which will promote misalignment in high complexity 
environments.  
We see management as a context-dependent and -constrained field (Whetten, 2009; 
Poulis, Poulis, & Plakoyiannaki, 2013). Nevertheless, our focus on context and on the 
organization as a collective conceptualization does not neglect a fundamental observation: 
individuals make up the organization. Despite the anthropomorphic qualities that we, 
scholars, routinely attribute to organizations, the “organization” is an aggregation, which 
always has individuals at the epicenter of its construction. Our focus on this elementary fact 
(i.e., the human agent and his/her traits) is backed up by a simple reason: assuming the CEO 
and his/her personality out would ignore his/her centrality in organizational decision-making. 
Indeed, the relevant literature promotes “core self-evaluation” as a key concept aggravating 
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CSQ. Core self-evaluation is a broad personality characteristic that encompasses first-order 
constructs such as self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, emotional adjustment or stability, 
and locus of control (Johnson, Rosen, & Levy, 2008; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2003; 
Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). More specifically, CEOs and top management teams with 
high core self-evaluations are “well adjusted, positive, self-confident, efficacious, and believe 
in their own agency” (Judge et al., 2003: 304). This is because first-order constructs of core 
self-evaluation essentially reflect own perceptions of “self-worth [and] ability to perform and 
cope successfully within an extensive range of situations . . . to feel calm and secure . . . [to 
believe] that desired effects result from one’s own behavior rather than by fate or others” 
(Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012: 83). An imposed or voluntary yet tight 
integration of the management team around a confident and narcissistic CEO may reveal an 
idiosyncratic "communicatively"-orientated internal conversation within the executive group. 
Such integration may reinforce CSQ as a result of robust individual underpinnings i.e., 
CEO’s personality traits. Thus: 
Proposition 4c: The higher a CEO’s or top management team’s core-self evaluations, 
the more likely there will be high CSQ, which will promote misalignment in high 
complexity environments.  
Hence, self-justified discretion is expected to be deployed under such conditions of 
narcissism and optimism. At the same time, it is expected that the sustainable performance 
noted in Proposition 4b will act as an enabling condition for both “core self-evaluation” and 
“managerial discretion” by boosting the former and legitimizing the latter. This multifactorial 
picture leads to a question: Why should we change what we do here? Moreover, the latitude 
that the CEO enjoys to maintain or change decisions and strategies at large (Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987) will increase and legitimize discretion in complex environments (Peteraf & 
Reed, 2007). This is partly due to the inherent ambiguity in the means–end relationship 
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regarding the “appropriateness” of decision making (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Time is 
limited, information becomes unwieldy to process, resources do not allow costly analyses 
(Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005), and, thus, decision makers are almost 
automatically driven toward decisions that are based on “what has worked for them before, 
what they find familiar or comfortable, and what fits their cognitive schema” (Hambrick et 
al., 2005: 478); in essence, increasing their CSQ. Therefore, ambiguity skews responsibility 
towards the person in charge, especially when he/she is characterized by high core self-
evaluations and feels confident that he/she is the right person for the right decisions. Thus: 
Proposition 4d: The higher the degree of managerial discretion, the more likely there 
will be high CSQ, which will promote misalignment in high complexity environments.  
Disequilibrium and velocity are often seen as negative conditions. Internal stability is 
preferred since not all actors are equally skilful or sufficiently willing to exploit the 
opportunities and tackle the challenges that institutional disruption or market turbulence 
generates (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). That is, an entrepreneurial orientation is associated 
with deviation from established norms, which requires complex organizational 
arrangements—a practice that many firms simply avoid (McClelland et al., 2010). 
Consequently, a non-entrepreneurial mindset is embraced by actors who, for example, have 
been historically privileged in a setting (Garud et al., 2007). This stance of “no action” is 
further reinforced if more actors—especially ones with a central, powerful position—have 
been equally privileged (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Such an industry 
becomes stratified with dominant players (e.g., reputable or large firms) occupying a central, 
“elite” position in the industry’s network (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006a) note that this centrality reflects the ability to sustain prevailing logics, due 
to aligned interests in a favorable environment. In turn, this leads to a hegemonic culture of 
preservation and stability. Of course, we acknowledge that logics are subject to fluidity and 
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reconfiguration, too. For example, this hegemony or dominant hierarchy may be dispersed 
and diluted if diverse, powerful actors want change toward multiple paths. Then, the 
disruption and the challenge to maintain conditions that have accounted for superior 
performance may be higher. Network heterogeneity may engender conflicting goals that is 
unlikely to accommodate all contradictory expectations. Therefore, continuity may (not) be 
the desired outcome, depending on each actor’s perspective and dominance. Thus: 
Proposition 5: The more the privileged organizations in an external environment that 
leans toward a chaotic regime (high external complexity) and the more central and 
powerful the position of a privileged organization, the higher its CSQ and the less the 
likelihood of configuring internal processes and actions in complex ways (low 
internal complexity). Hence, the less the likelihood that the LRV (complexity) is 
confirmed in such conditions of complexity misalignment. 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
Following a dialectical interrogation of a cross-disciplinary law and consistent with 
Alvesson and Sandberg’s (2011) problematization logic, we not only identified, but also 
articulated and challenged deterministic, isomorphic and teleological assumptions that cut 
across the management literature. To our knowledge, this is the only study that has used such 
means to do so. Yet, we did not provide a critique of the array of studies that normatively use 
the LRV in order to simply dispel its shortcomings. The ultimate objective was to revitalize 
debates (e.g. choice vs. determinism) and themes (e.g. strategy and the environment) as well 
as open up new possibilities for concept development (e.g. complexity misalignment) and 
novel theorizing (e.g. human agency in complex regimes). Assisted by institutional and 
commitment discourses, we crafted propositions that can inspire a wider dialogue related to 
core management themes and the LRV’s main tenets. In particular, we problematized 
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adaptation and survival-centric views of strategizing by theorizing the plausibility of non-
mimetic, non-isomorphic action that defies the typical urge to match external imperatives. 
The “choice vs. determinism” debate –especially during the 1980s (Astley and Van de 
Ven, 1983; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985)- has framed strategic 
decisions under the banner of adaptation2. Our study promotes a few unconventional theses 
related to this framing. First, choice may not be understood irrespectively of the orientation of 
an organization. What the latter wishes to become or why it wishes to reproduce itself are 
powerful explanations of action. Therefore, our focus on idiosyncratic interests allows us to 
revisit the explanatory utility of adaptive and contingency perspectives (see also Edwards & 
Meliou, 2015; Hesketh & Fleetwood, 2006). By explaining how actors connect with 
complexity, we demonstrate that it is not the environment per se that shapes adaptive or not 
action; a legacy that permeates management scholarship. Rather, it is the mediating reflexive 
judgment of decision-makers that does so; a point that opens up a largely uncharted 
theorizing territory related to currently elusive or obscure themes of core importance (e.g. 
unexplainable performance differences and unnoticed, divergent managerial acts). 
Certainly, we do not deny that the environment constrains and informs choice (Bedeian, 
1990; de Rond & Thietart, 2007). Yet, this choice does not only translate into adapting to 
environmental demands. This may be the case when e.g. market stratification, power 
inequalities or institutional pressures call for isomorphic action (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). However, environmental features may just be a backdrop to 
radical resource mobilization when the orientation is visionary or the aspirations are 
unconventional; strategic choice may translate into mere inertia when the orientation has risk-
reducing overtones. Therefore, our study highlights the value of researching qualitatively 
distinct types of the relationship between strategy and the environment. For example, the 
latter may indeed dictate choice in typical deterministic terms (such as leading to adaptation). 
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However, it may also simply influence choice as a conceptual springboard (e.g. shaping 
consciousness for change); it may be a legitimizing vehicle for choice (e.g. overwhelming 
external complexity may solidify organizational apraxia); it may be a “multi-colored” 
reference point for choice (e.g. aspects of the environment to avoid or others to be inspired 
from); or may simply inform choice in an interplay with inducements from within (e.g. 
building identity aspirations upon industry norms). We urge for a frame-breaking vocabulary 
that complements and advances current foci on matching and isomorphism. In doing so, we 
call for revisiting the “choice/determinism” debate through neglected social, discursive and 
critical paradigms (cf. Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Holt & Sandberg, 2011). 
This more nuanced understanding of the strategy/environment relationship becomes even 
more important in the context of complexity theories. There, Ashby’s legacy and assumptions 
related to adaptation and survival are so prevalent that they constitute the underpinning 
nomological network of the entire field. For example, complex adaptive systems theorists 
seek to understand the behavior of individual agents in order to surmise systemic survival. 
Yet, this is done assuming that agents adapt their own behaviour to how others in the 
population behave (Burnes, 2005). Apparently, such an “adaptationist” approach neglects the 
possibility for organizations to be e.g. complex recursive systems that continually reproduce 
themselves (Houchin & Maclean, 2005). The complexity literature, thus, routinely privileges 
the deterministic role of the environment in shaping choices and largely neglects equally 
influential individualistic concerns. Instead, our study sees strategizing also as an exercise of 
reflection and inner deliberations, as the outcome of transformational or reproduction 
orientations, and as the mirror of self-interests and needs. Hence, we revitalize the “choice vs. 
determinism” debate by situating it within a complexity perspective. 
Specifically, we introduce three concepts that enrich the complexity vocabulary: (1) 
complexity misalignment, which includes (2) complexity amplification in an ordered regime 
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and (3) complexity disregard in a chaotic regime. These conceptualizations represent novel 
misaligned instances of imaginative distance from current arrangements and others that 
suppress transformative action, and, instead, reinforce habitual manifestations of agency. We, 
thus, enlarge the scope of theorizing by anchoring agentic acts within antithetical complexity 
regimes. More specifically, we show that chaos and order trigger conscious choices shaped 
by thoughts and feelings and we frame a) internal complexification as the projective 
mechanism to override structural constraints and pursue change—in this case, internal 
complexity is not an unintended amalgamation of routines and processes, but the deliberate 
way through which enactive agency manifests itself; b) complexity-aggravated constraints as 
the impetus of conscious no praxis through an iterative orientation—in this case, external 
complexity is not a detrimental constraint, but the enabling platform for intentionality and 
discretionary non-action. Such conceptualization of how agentic acts unfold in regimes that 
constrain (e.g., due to unfavorable institutional arrangements) or enable (e.g., due to an 
actor’s position) discretion also allows us to complement repertoires of dealings with 
complexity (e.g., complexity reduction, absorption, mediation, penetration; Boisot, 2000; 
Boisot & Child, 1999; Child & Rodrigues, 2011) while elaborating upon situated action. 
Furthermore, we portray complexity misalignment not only as a volitional pursuit, but 
also as a viable strategizing principle. Up to this point, this misalignment has not been seen as 
a conscious act but, rather, as a detrimental choice that is devoid of prudence and contextual 
awareness. Our theses challenge this convention in the complexity literature where aspects of 
human intervention such as action, intentionality, or choice are sparingly used and are often 
seen as non-rational (Child & Rodrigues, 2011). Thus, we make an important claim that 
agency matters in complexity. Yet, we know little of how agency is exercised in respective 
contexts. This is surprising given that the word “complex” features as the common adjective 
that describes our world’s structural properties and the fact that the “agency/structure” debate 
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is one of the most enduring in social sciences. This “how” element is also the main 
distinguishing feature in the ontological “battle” between dualism- (e.g., Archer’s 
morphogenesis) and duality-centric3 (e.g., Giddens’s structuration) perspectives on the 
agency/structure problématique. Yet we do not know how these analytical logics are 
employed in varyingly complex realms (exceptions include Mutch, 2007 and Jarzabkowski, 
2008). We flesh out (non)dealings with chaotic and ordered structures as our contribution to 
the “how” question. Thus, we respond to calls on how diverse contexts support (or conduce 
to) certain agentic orientations (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), the conditions under which 
forms of intentionality emerge (Lawrence et al., 2011), and the need to provide coherent 
accounts of agency related to both change and maintenance (Delbridge & Edwards, 2007).  
Through our complexity amplification thesis, we complement studies (e.g. Padgett & 
Powell, 2012), which emphasize the role of networks in the emergence of organizational 
novelty4. In line with empirical cases that demonstrate the efficacious agency of various 
individuals, we situate agentic acts in a wider structural and relational context; albeit, our 
focus is more microfoundational in nature (i.e., the actor; organizations or individuals within 
them). Contrary to much of the relevant theory, we do not consider individuals’ role as a 
reductionist approach nor individual pursuits as epiphenomena to social processes. We, 
rather, see agency as a building block of structural shape (Mutch et al., 2006). We, thus, 
contribute by highlighting “choice and constraint, individual spontaneity and social 
patterning” (Hitlin & Elder, 2007: 173) as well as the morphogenetic properties of human 
action and interaction. In fact, ours is one of the few studies that integrate the relational 
nature of agency with individual traits (Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Suddaby & Viale, 
2011). Throwing the spotlight on both in a context of complex regimes allows us to question 
purist approaches that either devalue structural relevance or adopt a “downward” ontology 
that privileges structural over agentic explanations. We, thus, caution that agency is never 
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fully voluntary, personalized or unleashed nor the structural effects wholly deterministic 
(Delbridge & Edwards, 2007), especially in a complex setting (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013).  
Blending institutions, agency and complexity is important given the scholarly interest in 
“institutional complexity”. Two features are worth-noting. First, institutional complexity is 
defined as multiple logics that co-exist, or as “collision”, “incompatibility”, and 
“contradiction” in co-existing logics (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 
2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013); conceptualizations that are 
different to what complexity normally refers to (e.g. the emergence of order out of chaos). 
Second, institutional complexity is associated with identity aspirations i.e., what an 
organization wishes to become by dealing with perceived complexity and not with its 
adaptive response given what the organization actually is (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). Our 
“amplification” and “disregard” theses echo this “inside-out” perspective and contrast the 
routine view of complexity as leading to “outside-in” responses. Overall, this multivocality 
reflects the field-laden understanding of complexity, which elongates the breadth of its 
applications. Thus, in order to comprehend complexity, we must contextualize the discourse. 
In order to make it practically relevant, we must explicate the role of agency in experiencing 
and addressing its situated manifestations. However, the discourse has instead bifurcated 
along micro/macro lines, has emphasized causal externalities in the exercise of agency, or has 
portrayed agents as unreflexive receivers of structural constraints (Delbridge & Edwards, 
2013). We believe that we contribute in bridging such fragmentation. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
Misaligned configurations highlighted herein are not exhaustive, and arguments in the 
propositions are not conclusive. Other concepts can be also used to discuss the law’s 
applicability. Certainly, too, we acknowledge that several change or commitment-oriented 
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organizations may not survive. Thus, we do not seek to privilege agency as the sole antidote 
to the strains that variously complex regimes generate. In doing so, we distance ourselves 
from overvalorizing agency (MacKay & Chia, 2013), echo caution on the overemphasis on 
success stories, transformative capacity or power (Lawrence et al., 2011), and do not see 
organizations as “hypermuscular institutional entrepreneurs” (Lawrence et al., 2009: 1). We 
frame agency only as an effort for change or reproduction (echoing the definition of 
institutional work) noting that its efficacy can only be a posteriori assessed. Therefore, our 
study is limited to arguments that conceptually justify survival prospects under conditions of 
complexity misalignment; whether organizations will eventually survive is an empirical 
question that can only be tackled through further research. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
First, we urge for research in relation to the LRV’s main tenets: adaptation and survival. 
We stress the need to critically assess the causal efficacy of adaptation as a strategizing 
choice for varying teleological scenarios. Relevant questions may include how and under 
which conditions does adaptation (not) contribute to survival, prosperity, meaningfulness, or 
virtue? When is it preferable compared to conscious non-isomorphic pursuits? The 
disciplinary convention that adaptation is an inherent corporate ideal could be put under 
scrutiny, and future research could examine a context-laden counterargument (i.e., the 
conditions under which such an act yields suboptimal returns in light of varied orientations).  
We also recommend reflection upon the agency/complexity nexus. Currently, the 
understanding of how complex spaces shape and are shaped by agentic orientations is 
strikingly limited. When is complexity an unmanaged constraint that overshadows agency 
and its change-enabling potential? Under which conditions might complexity solidify 
morphostatic orientations? For example, following our amplification thesis, we call for 
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research on institutional genesis amid complexity. While the focus on the effects of logics is 
developed, relatively little is known about the morphogenetic properties that pre-date the rise 
of institutions (Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin-Andersson, & 
Suddaby, 2008). For example, what are the so-called “initial conditions” that govern the rate 
of change toward a new order (with sensitivity to these conditions being a defining feature of 
complex adaptive systems)? Are they pre-existing institutional logics or structural conditions 
at the inception of an institution? Are they preconditions that exist as memories whose legacy 
has spillovers to new, founding conditions (Houchin & Maclean, 2005)? We contend that 
analytical dualism can address potential conflation and shed light on such ontologically 
important questions that are of relevance to both institutional and complexity theories. Here, 
human intervention and interaction should have a key explanatory role. Institutions are social 
constructions (and not naturally occurring mechanisms) whose logic is contingently 
perceived, transmitted and used by interested people (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). 
Consequently, individual and collective manifestations of agency should be at the epicenter 
of institutional creation. Nevertheless, relevant knowledge is still rudimentary (Lok, 2010). 
The value of institutional work and CSQ is not confined to disciplinary silos. Rather, they 
“extend and integrate theoretical conversations across subcommunities of scholars and varied 
sources of management scholarship” (Suddaby, 2012b: 8). In the future, other concepts can 
also enrich theorizing in the sphere of complexity. We expect varying findings especially if 
misaligned configurations are conceived across management domains. Inspired by the 
idiosyncrasies of their fields, scholars can assess the performance potential of such 
configurations. For example, this paper presents an opportunity to provoke a wider dialogue 
around the LRV, including current debates about adaptability in complexity leadership 
studies. In this way, we will put the LRV in an empirical context and surmise when and why 
(non)-isomorphic schemas can be reasonably pursued. Overall, we urge management-cum-
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complexity theorists to blend non-complexity concepts into their narrative through a cross-
pollination logic. This logic is somehow lacking and engenders the threat, for complexity, of 
dislocating itself from management research, occupying a marginalized, parochial branch of 
no further importance for theorizing. What aggravates this threat is the lack of a research 
programme with real-life insights, without which, complexity applications run the risk of 
being seen as witchcraft (McKelvey, 1999); a conjecture (Houchin & MacLean, 2005); or as 
a metaphor (Lissack, 1999) where contradictions prevail (Corning, 2002).  
Finally, we join authors (e.g., Oswick, Fleming, & Hanlon, 2011) who caution about the 
universality of theories transferred from non-socially constructed into the organizational 
realm. We drew upon a paradigmatic case in point to demonstrate this. In turn, we urge for 
research that showcases how other borrowed theories are appropriated, and how they advance 
or impede the advancement of the management field (in line with Table 1 and Whetten, Felin, 
& King, 2009). Given the wide use of borrowed theories in management, similar studies can 
extend and refine our vocabulary, and, consequently, the boundaries of our understanding. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The LRV is not an empirical generalization drawn from observed regularities in social 
systems. We see it as the articulation of a conceptually appealing relation between properties 
of two systems (organizations’ internal/external variety/complexity). However, law-like 
generalizations are associated with the regularities that observed systems possess, since these 
mediate the relation between a law and predictability (Holt & Holt, 1993), the latter being a 
cornerstone of scientific rationality. Hence, given the lack of empirical observations, the term 
“law” is inherently problematic. Second, given the lack of methods that can measure complex 
properties of social systems, and the resulting inability to capture periodicity and regularity, 
how can one claim “prediction” and “determinism” (both reflecting modernist orientations 
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and law-generating assumptions in natural sciences)? Third, unlike physical systems, social 
systems cannot be subject to physical determinism, as we cannot explain or determine future 
states as being based on past ones. We can only achieve that (epistemic determinism; Hunt, 
1987) if we know the laws governing the nature of change within that system. However, how 
can we know these without empirical demonstrations of their periodicity or regularity? Thus, 
we return to aforementioned points, perpetuating a vicious circle of theoretical 
inappropriateness or misleading articulation of conceptually appealing ideas. 
Newtonian “laws” contrast our contingently constructed world (Tsoukas, 1998; Tsoukas 
& Hatch, 2001). Lado et al. (2006) have cautioned about this rigidity, while pointing to the 
threat, for management, in becoming ideological when it denies contradictions, tensions, and 
deviations from a universal norm as opportunities for refined theorizing. This is not 
management-specific; boundary conditions are often not set or researchers make sense of a 
theory by limiting it with their own simplified conceptualizations (Ragin, 1992). We, thus, 
caution about the so-called “paradigmatic theories,” explanatory devices that become a 
convention in a discourse (Whetten, 2009). Pinpointing that, unlike natural systems, 
prescriptions are less applicable in complex, unobservable settings where human agency 
prevails (Suddaby, 2010b) should not be treated as a disciplinary “nuisance” that challenges 
the “decontextualized ideal” of modernism (Toulmin, 1990) and positivism as its 
epistemological reflection (Boisot & McKelvey, 2010). Rather, shedding such light can help 
us to conceptualize the reasons behind discretionary organizational becoming or reproduction 
and their effects. Essentially, it helps us assess the usefulness of human agency—which is 
what management, as a field of inquiry, studies at large (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006b). 
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
The Appropriation of the LRV in Management 
 
How Has Application of the 
LRV Impeded the Advancement 
of Management? 
How Has Application of the LRV 
Facilitated the Advancement of 
Management? 
The centrality of 
environmental 
determinism and 
isomorphism 
It unduly prioritizes 
deterministic and isomorphic 
schemas as a prerequisite for 
survival. 
It serves as a heuristic rule that 
stresses the value of 
strategy/environment coalignment 
and fit. 
The intrinsic 
teleology and the 
exclusive efficacy 
of adaptation 
It promotes teleological 
determinism toward survival and 
ignores equifinality by limiting 
strategizing to an exclusive 
efficacy of adaptation. 
It promotes the undeniable value of 
adaptation as a structure- and 
context-sensitive strategy. 
Analytical 
assumptions on 
measurability 
It treats complexity as a 
measurable entity subjected to 
rational deliberation and 
effective matching 
representations. 
It opens up promising avenues to 
capture complexity dimensions in 
meaningful terms for organizations. 
An undue outside-
in perspective 
It promotes an image of 
organizations as pure reactors or 
passive recipients of external 
imperatives. 
It sensitizes scholars to the 
influence of structural conditions on 
the configurative capacity of 
decision makers. 
The neglected role 
of human agency 
It privileges system-level 
explanations at the expense of 
understanding humans’ acts that 
may themselves construct the 
external properties that the LRV 
studies and suggests to match. 
It has generated a rich 
understanding on how aggregate 
structural components may co-
evolve in non-linear ways. 
The uniformly dark It portrays complexity as an It alerts scholars and practitioners to 
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side of complexity inherently detrimental feature, 
with structural congruence being 
the prudent compromise. 
the often unwieldy challenges of 
managing complex settings. 
A superficial 
embrace of the law 
It theorizes upon non-empirical 
arguments and thus, delimits the 
complexity of the social world. 
It has facilitated theory 
development by allowing scholars 
to build upon a succinctly 
articulated law that is applicable in 
many cases. 
Theory-building 
architecture 
It ignores the possibility of 
boundary identification for the 
supposedly one right matching 
contingency. 
It further “legitimizes” insightful 
strategy domains such as 
contingency theory and 
organizational adaptation. 
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TABLE 2 
The LRV and Complexity Misalignment 
 
Organizational complexity 
 
High 
 
Low 
Environmental 
complexity 
 
High 
 
Complexity alignment 
(LRV) 
Complexity disregard 
through CSQ 
Low 
Complexity amplification 
through institutional work 
Complexity alignment 
(LRV) 
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1 We are grateful to one of the reviewers for these insights. 
2 Adaptation itself is a variably defined buzzword across the business literature. 
3 Duality is reflected in a dominant strategy wording such as “intextricably interwoven relationship”, 
“indispensably linked”, or the “constitutive interdependence” between strategy and the environment (e.g., see 
Bedeian, 1990). This nomenclature is useful as long as methodological implications (related to the value of 
analytical dualism) are clarified. However, without this clarification, it engenders a threat for conflation that 
blurs explanations of causation (e.g., it may mask the role of choice in strategizing). Perhaps, such wording (and 
its prevalence) is ‘responsible’ for the deterministic overtones that pervade much of management thought.  
4 Studies that borrow concepts from the sciences are often preoccupied with a ‘forward’ trajectory i.e., a focus 
on morphogenesis and field formation and how these eventually result to institutionalized structures and 
practices through distributed agency, collective sense-making and boundary-crossing initiatives. Certainly, 
Padgett & Powell’s edited collection provides numerous such illustrations that are of value and interest to 
scholars of emergence through their multiple autocatalytic networks. However, we caution that a focus on 
‘becoming’ should not underplay the similarly insightful, theorizing importance of morphostatic pressures and 
reproduction orientations.  
